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I INTRODUCTION 
An employment law issue which has come to recent attention is the use of r
estraint of trade 
clauses. Traditionally, these clauses have prevented employees competing wi
th the employer 
after their employment terminates. The competition could consist of the emp
loyee setting up 
their own business, or working for a competitor of the ex-employer. 
Competition from an ex-employee can cause an employer legitimate concer
n. During their 
employment, the employee may have been privy to confidential informatio
n. This "inside 
information" could then be used by the employee to compete unfairly with
 the employer. 
Further, clients of the employer may have been closely associated with the 
employee. This 
creates a danger that the employee may take those clients with them when th
eir employment 
ceases. 
These two situations have caused employers to provide, in the employment c
ontract, that an 
employee will not compete with the employer on the termination of their em
ployment. 
The common law doctrine of restraint of trade applies to these clauses. T
he effect of the 
doctrine is to make the clause prima facie invalid, because it is contrary to
 public policy. 
However, an employer can enforce the clause by showing that the cla
use protects a 
proprietary interest and is reasonable in doing so. 
While this paper will give a brief overview of the established principles o
f common law 
relating to restraints of trade, the primary focus will be on current and p
erceived future 
issues. Current issues include the interaction of section 104 of the Employme
nt Contracts Act 
1991 with the modifying power contained in section 8 of the Illegal Contracts
 Act 1970. This 
has implications for the another major topic of the paper: current issues in rel
ation to interim 
injunctions. The paper will also look at possible future extensions of the re
straint of trade 
doctrine to the areas of garden leave and secondary employment. 
II RESTRAINT OF TRADE CLAUSES AT COMMON LAW 
A Basic Definition 
Restraint of trade clauses have been used in a number of different situation
s. 1 The vendor 
of goodwill of a business can agree with the purchaser not to compete by
 carrying on a 
similar business. Traders or manufacturers may reach an agreement on 
the methods of 
carrying on business. 2 Also, an employee can agree that on the termi
nation of their 
2 
A Szakats Introduction to the Law of Employment (3 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1988) 59. 
This type of restraint of trade agreement raises 
different issues than those within the ambit of this 
paper, for example compliance with the Commerce Act
 
1986. 
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employment, he or she will not compete against the employer, either by working for a rival 
employer or starting up their own business. 
This paper focuses on the last of these. While the principles which apply in the other two 
situations are similar, it is recognised that "[t]he courts have developed a practice of viewing 
the position of an employee as particularly special and significant when dealing with restraint 
of trade claims by an employer. "3 
Restraint of trade clauses in the employment context raise their own particular considerations. 
For example, a restraint of trade clause typically restricts an employee's ability to work, 
whether it be in a specific industry or in a specified geographic area. This may deprive the 
employee of their livelihood, causing hardship. 
The definition of "restraint of trade" and the requirements of legality are laid down by the 
common law. In the context of employment law, the definition of "restraint of trade" was 
the subject of judicial debate.4 In one case, a restraint of trade clause was defined as one 
where " ... the covenantor agrees ... to restrict his liberty in the future to carry on trade with 
other persons not party to the contract. .. "
5 
This definition is too narrow to be an adequate exposition of "restraint of trade". A covenant 
in restraint of trade may bar the ex-employee from competing with the employer by setting 
up business in competition. This may not involve the employee "carrying on trade" with 
other people. 
A definition with a different focus is found in the Esso Petroleum
6 case, where Lord Reid 
defined "restraint of trade" as a contract where a person gives up a freedom they otherwise 
would have had.7 
This definition is preferable to the extent that it focuses on the freedoms which an employee 
has given up or had confined. However, taken out of context it could be very broad. 
This paper adopts the following definition of "restraint of trade": 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Mehigan and Griffiths Restraint of Trade and Business 
Secrets: Law and Practice (Longman, London, 1986) 59. 
See also Business Associates Ltd v Telecom Corporation 
of New Zealand Ltd (1992) 4 TCLR 685, 698. 
J D Heydon The Restraint of Trade Doctrine 
(Butterworths, London, 1971) 55. 
Petrofina (Great Britain) Ltd v Martin (1966] Ch 146, 
180 per Diplock LJ. 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harpers Garage (Stourport) Ltd 
(1968] AC 269. 
This definition is not without it's difficulties: 
Heydon, above n4, 57. 
5 
A prov1s1on in an employment contract under which a person agrees to accept 
additional restrictions as to the work which he or she may undertake during or after 
the term of that employment contract. 
In the employment situation, what has been labelled a "restraint of trade" has ty
pically 
involved an employee contracting not to work in a similar activity to the employer whe
n their 
employment ceases. 8 The restraint could also involve a financial burden on the emp
loyee, 
eg the payment of commission or a percentage of profits to the ex-employer. 
The restraint of trade doctrine has been applied when a person does not agree to the re
straint 
imposed on them. The restraint may be imposed by the rules of an external body to 
which 
the person is subject. 9 For example, in the Kemp case
10 it was held that rules of the 
NZRFL requiring clearance before a player could operate overseas were a restraint of
 trade. 
B Competing Interests 
Restraint of trade clauses involve a number of competing interests. One objective of t
he law 
is freedom of trade, as "[c]ompetition is a good and necessary thing. "
11 The public has an 
interest in workers being able to carry on their trade freely, benefitting society. V
alid 
restraint of trade covenants may lead to monopolisation.
12 Workers who have skills should 
be free to utilise them. 
Freedom of trade can conflict with the principle of freedom of contract: when two 
parties 
enter a contract freely they are bound, and the function of the court is to enforc
e that 
contract. 13 Freedom of contract would entail that an employer and an employee are f
ree to 
make their own contract, and if this includes a restraint of trade then the court should e
nforce 
it. Parliament has emphasised freedom of contract in the Employment Contracts Act
 1991. 
One of the underlying themes of the Act is an increasing reliance on contractual ru
les to 
govern the employment relationship. 
14 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Anderson et al Employment Law Guide (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1993) 535. 
Nagle v Fielden (1966) 2 QB 633. 
Kemp v New Zealand Rugby Football League Inc (1989) 3 
NZLR 463; (1989) 2 NZELC 96,790. 
Laser Alignment (NZ) 1984 Ltd v Scholz (1993) 2 ERNZ 
250, 259. 
M Jefferson "Evading the Doctrine of Restraint of 
Trade" (1990) 134 Solicitors Journal 532. 
Printing & Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) 
LR 19 Eq 462, 465. 
See, for example, the long title of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991. There is a marked emphasis on 
negotiation between the parties. 
6 
Another object of the Act, however, is to provide for freedom of association.
15 The nature 
of restraint of trade clauses means that by promoting freedom of contract, the emp
loyee's 
freedom of association may be hindered. The effect of a restraint of trade clause is 
to limit 
the employee's freedom of association. 
Restraint of trade clauses thus engender a conflict of legal principle and a clash of
 public 
policy.The desirability of employees moving freely between jobs has already been disc
ussed. 
However, a public policy critique must not overlook the major argument in fav
our of 
restraint of trade clauses: an employer may have an interest that legitimately d
eserves 
protection. For instance, the employer may be trying to build up a business and will 
wish to 
prevent the employee taking customers with them when their employment ceases. 
Because of these different interests at stake, the law fetters freedom of contract in r
elation 
to restraint of trade clauses. This is reflected in the common law requirements as to v
alidity. 
C Validity 
Common law rules regarding restraint of trade apply in New Zealand.
16 At common law, 
it is established that restraint of trade clauses are prima facie void, as being cont
rary to 
public policy. 17 
However, the clause may be enforced if the employer can show a proprietary i
nterest 
deserving protection, and that the clause is reasonable in protecting that in
terest. 
Reasonableness is judged from the point of view of the parties, and with regard to the
 public 
interest. 18 
1 Proprietary interest 
To justify a restraint of trade clause, an employer must be doing more than pro
tecting 
themselves from competition. 19 The employer must identify an asset in the business
 which 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Paragraph (a), long title of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991. This right is also guaranteed in s17 Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. 
Section ll(a) Illegal Contracts Act 1970. 
Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby [1916) 1 AC 688, 700 per 
Lord Atkinson. 
Debtor Management (NZ) Ltd v Quail [1993) 2 ERNZ 498, 
506. 
Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [1974) AC 391, 400; 
H&R Block Ltd v Sanott & another [1976) 1 NZLR 213, 
218. 
7 
is his or her property. Usually this "proprietary interest" con
sists of trade connections,
20 
or trade secrets. 21 
At common law an employee is not permitted to reveal truly c
onfidential information, even 
after their employment has ceased.
22 However, an employer may wish to have the added 
protection of a restraint of trade clause because it is uncle
ar exactly what amounts to 
"confidential" information. A restraint of trade clause may 
prevent possible disclosures 
before they can occur, by precluding the employee workin
g in a situation where the 
information might pass. 
Recently it has been recognised that an employer is able to prot
ect the goodwill of his or her 
business. 23 It appears that this is merely an alternative formulati
on of the protection afforded 
to customer connections. Holland J stated that " ... the primary
 purpose of the restraint of 
trade clause was to protect the goodwill of his firm by ensurin
g that the clients of the firm 
for whom the [employee] had come into contact should not go
 with the [employee] on his 
ceasing his employment. "
24 
2 Reasonableness 
The reasonableness of a restraint of trade clause is analysed f
rom the point of view of the 
parties at the time they entered the contract. The court 
can also take into account 
developments which would have been reasonably in contempla
tion of the parties.25 
(a) Duration, area and scope 
The main inquiry as to reasonableness centres on the dura
tion, area and scope of the 
restraint. On all three, the restraint must be no wider than
 is necessary to protect the 
employer's interests.
26 What is reasonable depends on the facts of a case, and the in
quiry 
is objective. The three inquiries are inter-related, as a reasona
ble duration may depend on 
the scope of activity which is prohibited.
27 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Herbert Morris, above n17, 710; Graphic Ho
ldings Ltd 
v Dunne (1988) 2 NZELC 95721, 95728;
 Business 
Associates Ltd, above n3, 698. 
Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand 
v Nielsen 
(1988) 2 NZELC 96040, 96047. 
Penninsular Real Estate Ltd v Harris [ 199
2] 2 NZLR 
216, 218. 
Cooney v Welsh [1993] 1 ERNZ 1, 6. 
Above n23. 
Above n23, 5; above n3, 21. 
Brown v Brown [1980] 1 NZLR 484, 495 per Ric
hardson J. 
Above n23, 8. 
8 
The duration of the restraint is looked at in relation to the length of 
time the employee has 
been employed. Also, in the recent Force Four case, Travis J looked a
t duration in relation 
to the amount of time before the contract expired.
28 
The nature of the area covered by the restraint will be taken into ac
count. In MA Watson 
Electrical Ltd v Kelling2
9 the restraint covered an area with a radius of fifteen kilometres. 
What made the area unreasonable was the fact that it covered Auckland
 city, so the employee 
was " ... prevented from gaining employment in the largest market in 
the country. "30 
The scope of activities prohibited is important, and a restraint may 
be unreasonable if the 
employee is completely prohibited from working in any capacity in a
 given field.31 
(b) Employee-related factors 
The employee must have been privy to confidential information, or be
en in contact with the 
employer's customers. 32 If not, it will be difficult for the employer to arg
ue that a restraint 
is necessary to protect any proprietary interest. It is questionable wheth
er the employer would 
even have a proprietary interest to protect. 
Also, the court may look at the relative bargaining strengths of the p
arties. If an employee 
only agreed to a restraint clause because of the employer's superior b
argaining power, it is 
unlikely that the clause will be reasonable. 
33 Lack of legal advice will be taken into account. 
A restraint is generally unreasonable if the injurious effect on the em
ployee is greater than 
the benefit to the employer. 
34 An employer may be able to avoid this problem with a garden 
leave clause, as the employee would be paid while the restraint was 
in place. However, as 
will be discussed, garden leave clauses may themselves be subject to
 the restraint of trade 
doctrine. 
(c) Time restraint entered into 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Force Four NZ Ltd v curtling Unreported, 14 Jun
e 1994, 
Employment Court Auckland Registry AEC 30/94, 
18. 
[ 19 9 3 ] 1 ERN Z 9 . 
Above n29, 14. 
Above n29, 15; Bates v Gates (1987) 1 NZELC 
95269, 
95273; above n26, 495. 
Bates, above n31, 95273. 
Above n29, 17; Bates, above n31, 95272; abov
e n18, 
508. 
Bates, above n31, 95272; Key Graphics (Aucklan
d) Ltd 
v Verhoeyen (1989) 2 NZELC 96566; Force Four,
 above 
n28, 6. 
9 
In the Radio Horowhenua case, the restraint of trade was i
mposed as a variation of the 
original contract. Goddard CJ distinguished this from the restra
int being agreed to at the start 
of employment, when it is presumed to be freely negotiated.
35 A restraint imposed from the 
outset is presumed to be freely negotiated because " ... the em
ployee had a choice between 
accepting the job on those terms or declining it. "
36 
This distinction seems illogical. Because a contract is negot
iated at the beginning of an 
employment relationship is insufficient reason to presume that
 it was freely negotiated. The 
time at which a restraint is entered into is relevant, but not in
 ascertaining whether it was 
freely negotiated. 
When an employee agrees to a restraint of trade being impo
sed, the employer must give 
valuable consideration. If the restraint is part of the original bilater
al contract between the 
parties, consideration poses no problem. However, recent 
cases have emphasised the 
importance of consideration if a restraint is imposed later. In 
the Force Four case, Travis J 
found that the absence of consideration for a subsequently im
posed restraint " ... militate[d] 
strongly against the restraint being found to be reasonable in M
r Curtling's case. '137
 
(d) Termination of employment 
If a restraint clause applies irrespective of the reason for the 
employment contract's 
termination, the court is less likely to view the restraint as rea
sonable. 38 
It should be noted that even if a restraint clause is found to be r
easonable in it's terms, it will 
be of no effect if the employee was wrongfully dismissed.
39 Whether the same can be said 
of a finding of unjustifiable dismissal under the personal grie
vance procedure is yet to be 
explored. 
(e) Public interest and the Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Restraint clauses must be reasonable in the public interest. Th
is consideration was raised in 
the Medic Corporation case. 
40 The court took account of the public's interest in decreasing 
the cost of medical treatment. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Radio Horowhenua Ltd v Bradley [ 1993 J 2 ERNZ
 1085, 
1096. 
Force Four, above n28, 6. 
Force Four, above n28, 17. 
Above n35, 1097; above n28, 15. 
General Billposting Ltd v Atkinson [1909) A
C 118. What 
amounts to wrongful dismissal is a com
plex issue 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Medic Corporation Ltd v Barrett [1993) 3 E
RNZ 523. 
10 
A consideration which has not yet been fully explored is sectio
n 17 of the Bill of Rights Act 
1990. This provides that for the right to freedom of associa
tion. It was suggested in the 
Debtor Management case that this provision may render a restr
aint clause containing blanket 
restrictions unlawful. 4
1 
The potential impact of the Bill of Rights Act is uncertain. It wou
ld appear to make it much 
more difficult for the employer to argue that the restraint was r
easonable. The Bill of Rights 
Act states that everyone is entitled to freedom of association
. A restraint of trade clause 
attempts to cut down this right. 
Under section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, freedoms may be su
bject to reasonable limits 
prescribed by law.4
2 The limit in a restraint of trade situation, however, is prescr
ibed by 
the employer in the employment contract, not by law. Also, it sh
ould not be possible to 
argue that the limit is prescribed by law because the restraint is
 enforceable at common law. 
The common law is not prescribing this limit, but merely faili
ng to find it void. 
It can also be questioned whether a restraint of trade is demonstr
ably justified in a free and 
democratic society. Employees could emphasise the word "fr
ee", and that workers should 
be free to move within the job market. For the employer to en
force the restraint, he or she 
must demonstrate that it is justified in limiting this freedo
m. The proprietary interest 
protected should be an important one, and an employer shou
ld have to show more than a 
suspicion that the employee will act adversely to it if not restr
ained. 
The Bill of Rights Act and the freedom of association shou
ld become a weighty public 
interest consideration. 
At common law, if a restraint was found to be unreasonabl
e the contract became void. 
However, under the common law principle of severance the c
lause could be severed from 
the remainder of the contract, or the objectionable elements se
vered from the clause. 
When severing a clause, the court would not rewrite the contr
act.43 It had to be possible to 
"blue pencil" the unreasonable elements, with the remaining e
lements making grammatical 
sense. Severance could only occur if " ... the term is divisible 
into separate covenants ... " .
44 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Above n18, 510. Colgan J did not deal with
 the point 
fully as it had not been raised by counse
l. Also, a 
similar suggestion was made in the Radio 
Horowhenua 
case, with reference to section 14 of th
e Bill of 
Rights (the right to freedom of expression
). 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 pro
vides that 
the freedoms in the Act may be subject to 
reasonable 
limitations prescribed by law which are de
monstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.
 
Chitty on Contracts (20 ed, Sweet and Maxwe
ll, London, 
1989) vol 1, para 1284. 
Above n12, 532; Attwood v Lamont (1920] 3 K
B 571. 
11 
ill POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS OF THE RESTRAINT OF TRAD
E DOCTRINE 
While the restraint of trade doctrine
45 has previously been applied to restraints operating 
after the termination of employment, it has the potential to apply 
in two other areas. 
A Garden Leave 
The doctrine may apply to what is known as "garden leave". Gar
den leave is when " ... the 
employee is made subject to a lengthy notice requirement, dur
ing which the employer 
continues to pay the employee his normal wage, though not requir
ing him to actually work, 
in return for which the employee is bound not to take employm
ent elsewhere during that 
period. n46 
Employment does not cease until the notice period has expired
. 47 An employee who is 
subject to a garden leave clause is being restrained before their em
ployment has terminated. 
It can, however, be argued that garden leave amounts to a restr
aint of trade. Whether a 
clause is in restraint of trade or not " .. .is to be determined not b
y the form the stipulation 
wears, but.. .by it's effect in practice. "
48 In practice, if an employee is kept on lengthy 
garden leave, he or she is prevented from finding work elsewhere
. 49 
In New Zealand, it seems to have been suggested that garden lea
ve is not covered by the 
doctrine. In Radio Horowhenua Ltd v Bradley, Goddard CJ stated
 that if remuneration is 
payable during the restraint, "[s]uch an arrangement goes a long w
ay towards negativing an 
intention to exercise dominion over the person of the employee. "
50 
Be that as it may, the legal effect of remuneration is questiona
ble. The intention of an 
employer to exercise dominion over an employee is not a prerequ
isite to finding a restraint 
of trade. The only way payment of remuneration detracts from fi
nding a restraint of trade 
is the lack of hardship to the employee. 
51 Hardship to the employee, however, is but one 
factor considered by the court. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Now referred to as "the doctrine". 
Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterw
orths, 
London, 1992) vol 16, Employment, para 17, p 2
3. See 
also Rank Xerox New Zealand Ltd v U-Bix Copiers
 (NZ) 
Ltd Unreported, 20 December 1985, High Court Au
ckland 
Registry A 1407/85. 
Above nl, 268. 
Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips, above nl9, 
402. 
This has been argued by Paul Gouldring "Injun
ctions 
and Contracts of Employment: The Evening Sta
ndard 
Doctrine" {1990) 19 ILJ 98, 101. 
Above n35, 1096. 
See above Part II C. 
12 
On the basis of legal principle it seems plausible that a garden leave clause cou
ld be covered 
by the restraint of trade doctrine. This conclusion is acceptable in terms of pu
blic policy. If 
garden leave clauses were not subject to the doctrine, employers could effe
ctively buy a 
restraint. Garden leave has a similar practical effect to conventional restraint c
lauses, and by 
paying compensation the employer could avoid the restraint of trade doctrine
. 
If the law enabled employers to buy a restraint, one positive result may b
e that paying 
compensation could involve serious consideration by the employer as to w
hether it was 
necessary to restrain the employee. 
However, negative consequences may also result. If an employer has decided 
it is worth 
restraining an employee, to get "value for money" he or she may draft the r
estraint more 
restrictively than they otherwise would have. Not being subject to the rest
raint of trade 
doctrine, this unreasonable clause may never be subjected to judicial review. 
On the whole, it seems preferable that garden leave clauses be subjected to th
e restraint of 
trade doctrine. 
B Secondary Employment 
Another issue for future consideration is whether a restraint which operates du
ring the term 
of employment could be covered by the doctrine. Such a clause would prohibit
 the employee 
engaging in secondary employment during their spare time. In terms of the le
gal definition 
of restraint of trade, it may be possible for the doctrine to cover such restrain
ts. 
There is little authority as to whether the doctrine covers restraints o
n secondary 
employment. In the American Restatement (First) of Contracts, promises by 
the employee 
not to compete during the term of service were included in the definition o
f "restraint of 
trade" .52 
The definitions of restraint of trade set down in the Petrofina and Esso Petr
oleum cases53 
may cover restraints operating during employment. On the Petrofina test, the
 employee is 
agreeing to restrict their liberty to carry on trade in the future. "In the future
" could mean 
any time after the conclusion of the contract. 
The application of the Esso Petroleum test is more problematic. One must as
k whether the 
employee is giving up a freedom they otherwise would have had. The issue t
hen becomes: 
does an employee have the freedom to enter secondary employment? 
One of the terms implied by law into an employment contract is the employee's
 duty to serve 
52 
53 
Section 516(6) Restatement (First) of Contracts. 
See 
Handler and Lazaroff "Restraint of Trade and 
the 
Restatement {Second) of Contracts" ( 1982) 57 NY
ULR 
669, 673. This reference has been deleted in 
the 
Restatement {Second) of Contracts: section 188(2) 
(b). 
See above n5 and n6. 
13 
the employer with good faith and fidelity.
54 This duty is somewhat amorphous, and the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal has stated that it has no fixed test. 
55 It prohibits conduct that a 
person of ordinary honesty would regard as dishonest towards the employ
er. 56 
Part of the duty of fidelity is the duty of faithful service. This duty is b
reached 11 [w]hen 
secondary employment in the employee's spare time adversely affects
 the employer's 
interests ... 1157 If an employee undertakes secondary employment in a sim
ilar enterprise to 
their first job, and the work is of a similar character, they may be acting 
in breach of the 
duty of fidelity. 58 This is the traditional statement of the duty. 
Recently the New Zealand Court of Appeal gave a wider interpretation of th
e duty in TISCO 
Ltd v Communication & Energy Workers Union
59
• The Court held that 
11 [a]ny conduct by 
an employee which is likely to damage the employer's business, for insta
nce by impairing 
its goodwill, or to undermine significantly the trust which the employer is
 entitled to place 
in the employee, could constitute a breach of duty. 
1160 
This is a wider exposition of the duty than that expressed in Hivac, and it
 does not require 
that the employee undertake work of a similar nature. The TISCO case invol
ved an employer 
who serviced electronic equipment, and an employee who, in his spare t
ime, bought and 
repaired similar equipment for resale. 
In the Employment Court Goddard CJ held that as the employee did not in
tend to injure the 
employer, the duty of fidelity was not breached.
61 The Court of Appeal, conversely, found 
that even though employer and employee were operating in different mark
ets, there was a 
risk of direct competition, and the employee posed a risk to the good
will of TISCO's 
customers. 62 This undermined the trust required in an employment relationship. 
In light of the TISCO case, the primary inquiry as regards the duty of fide
lity, is no longer 
whether the secondary employment is of a similar nature. Instead, the foc
us is on the risk 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Schilling v Kidd Garrett Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 243, 247. 
Above n54, 248. 
Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315, 316. 
Above nl, 168. 
Hi vac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd
 
[1946] Ch 169; Philip Kunick Ltd v Smyth, quoted in
 
Szakats, above nl, 169. 
[1993] 2 ERNZ 779. 
Above n59, 782. 
TISCO Ltd v Communication & Energy Workers Union 
[1992] 2 ERNZ 1087, 1100. 
Above n59, 782. 
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which the secondary employment poses to the employer's business. A court will also inquire 
whether the relationship of trust between employer and employee is jeopardised. This makes 
breach of the duty extremely dependant on the facts in a case. 
If the secondary employment which is prohibited by a restraint clause infringes the duty of 
fidelity, it should not be subject to the restraint of trade doctrine. The restraint clause would 
not be taking away a liberty that the employee otherwise would have had. Therefore, the 
clause would not satisfy the definition of "restraint of trade" in the Esso case. 
Also, if the clause was subject to the doctrine, it would be prima facie void. The employer 
would have to show that it was reasonable and protected a proprietary interest. This would 
undermine the duty of fidelity. To enforce the duty codified in the restraint clause, the 
employer would have to prove a proprietary interest. 
Because breach of the duty of fidelity depends heavily on the facts in a given case, it is not 
possible to lay down a blanket rule (that clauses prohibiting secondary employment which 
is likely to damage the employer's business are not subject to the restraint of trade doctrine). 
Whether a clause prohibiting secondary employment is subject to the doctrine can only be 
determined in light of the specific secondary employment undertaken by the employee. 
What is proposed, therefore, is a two-fold inquiry: 
(a) Is the secondary employment prohibited by the clause in breach of the implied 
duty of fidelity? 
(b) If so, the clause is not subject to the restraint of trade doctrine, and 1s 
governed by the implied duty of fidelity. 
If not, the clause is subject to the restraint of trade doctrine. The employer must 
then prove that the clause is reasonable and protects a proprietary interest. 
In practice, whether the clause is governed by the implied duty or the restraint of trade 
doctrine an employer will adduce similar evidence. For instance, the risk to the employer's 
business (under the implied duty analysis) and a proprietary interest (under the restraint of 
trade doctrine) would involve similar evidence. 
The one area where the distinction may be significant is for part-time workers. The wide 
formulation of the implied duty laid down by the Court of Appeal in TISCO could have 
serious consequences for these workers. People who work a number of part-time jobs may 
be prevented from earning a proper living. 
If an express term prohibited secondary employment, the employee would benefit if it was 
analysed under the restraint of trade doctrine. The clause is presumed to be void, and a 
factor considered under reasonableness is the degree of hardship to the employee. If the 
employee is prevented from earning a living, this would be a strong consideration against 
enforcing the clause. 
To summarise, whether a clause prohibiting secondary employment is covered by the 
restraint of trade doctrine depends on whether, in a given case, the secondary employment 
breaches the implied duty of fidelity. A blanket rule is not advisable, and cases must be 
15 
looked at individually. 
IV ENFORCING RESTRAINT OF TRADE CLAUSES: THE STATUTORY POWER 
TO MODIFY 
Recently, a major restraint of trade issue has been the extent of the courts' power to modify 
unreasonable clauses. As discussed above, 
63 at common law the ability of courts to modify 
an unreasonable restraint was severely curtailed. This ability has been expanded under New 
Zealand statute law. 
A Illegal Contracts Act 1970 
Section 8(1) of the Illegal Contracts Act 1970 provides: 
Where any provision of any contract constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade, 
the Court may -
(a) Delete the provision and give effect to the contract as so amended; or 
(b) So modify the provision that at the time the contract was entered into the 
provision as modified would have been reasonable, and give effect to the contract as 
so modified; or 
(c) Where the deletion or modification of the provision would so alter the bargain 
between the parties that it would be unreasonable to allow the contract to stand, 
decline to enforce the contract. 
In exercising the modification powers contained in section 8(1)(b), a court has more freedom 
to modify the contract than under common law severance. The clause need not consist of 
separate covenants, and there is no limit on how the court can modify the contract. 
Section 8 raises a number of issues. The first is: when can a court modify a restraint? Section 
8(l)(b) itself does not give any guidance. 
On the basis of statutory interpretation, section 8(1)(c) implies that an unreasonable clause 
should be modified unless it would alter the bargain to a great extent. This approach was 
taken in the H & R Block case, where Somers J indicated that the section gives the court a 
true discretion as to whether a covenant should be modified. In the case, Somers J modified 
the clause, because there were " ... no inhibiting factors or factors of sufficient cogency to 
lead me to exercise any discretion I might have against the plaintiff. "
64 This approach was 
affirmed by the High Court in Cooney v Welsh. 
65 
Recently, Smellie J appears to have departed from this approach in the MA Watson case: 
"[c]learly what is called for, however, is a careful, balanced, judicial appraisal of what is 
63 
64 
65 
See above Part II C. 
Above nl9, 220. This approach has been followed: above 
n26; Bates v Gates, above n31. 
Above n23, 7. 
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required to reach a fair and reasonable result. "
66 This approach does not involve a 
presumption in favour of exercising the discretion. It is a more balanced approach, analysing 
the "justice" of the final result. 
In the case, Smellie J declined to exercise the discretion because of the superior bargaining 
position of the employer, and the employee's lack of understanding of the covenant. It is 
questionable whether these factors would have been considered "cogent" by the judge in H 
& R Block. It seems likely that if it is followed, the more balanced approach in MA Watson 
will lead to fewer modifications of restraint of trade clauses. 
It has been suggested by the Employment Court that the section 8 power to modify 
unreasonable clauses should not be exercised if insufficient consideration was given for the 
restraint. 67 
The second issue pertaining to section 8 is the meaning of the word "modify". The Court of 
Appeal has held that "modify" is not confined to moderating or limiting covenants - it may 
mean simply varying or changing. 
68 A court could make a restraint clause more restrictive 
than the parties had agreed on (as the High Court did in Cooney v Welsh). 
While this reasoning may seem acceptable on the wording of section 8(l)(b), it is difficult 
to see when a court could justify making a restraint more restrictive. The power to modify 
only arises if a restraint is unreasonable. If a clause is considered unreasonable, a court could 
not easily justify increasing the restraint. 
69 
Another issue in relation to section 8 is the potential to use it to modify grossly unreasonable 
restraints. Prima facie, section 8 would not preclude such a use. However, it has been 
suggested that clauses drawn with no attempt at reasonableness should not be enforced. In 
Mason v Provident Clothing & Supply Company Ltd'
0 Lord Moulton indicated that if an 
employer has deliberately drawn the clause too widely, the courts should not assist the 
employer by modifying the clause to the maximum that might have been drafted. These 
sentiments were adopted in the context of section 8 by Barker J in Greenwich v Murray & 
Stewart.71 
This is a sound conclusion. If courts modified grossly unreasonable clauses, employers may 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
Above n29, 17. 
Above n2 8, 21; above n2 9, 2 3 . See the discussion 
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Cooney v Welsh (1993] 1 ERNZ 407, 410 per Cooke P. 
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(1913] AC 724, 745. 
(1979) 1 NZIPR 181, 186. 
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deliberately draw a clause too widely, and hope that the employee did not challenge it. Even 
if the employee did challenge it, the court would trim it down to make it acceptable. 
The Greenwich approach sends a different message to employers. If clauses are deliberately 
drawn too widely, they will not be modified and enforced. Employers must make a genuine 
attempt to draft a reasonable clause. 
Currently, the major issue in relation to section 8 is its relationship to section 104 of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
B Employment Contracts Act 1991
72 
The Employment Court has jurisdiction to apply section 8 of the Illegal Contracts Act under 
section 104(l)(h) of the EC Act: 
(1) The Court shall have jurisdiction -
(h) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, to make in any proceedings founded on 
or related to an employment contract any order that the High Court or a District 
Court may make under any enactment or rule of law relating to contracts: 
However, when exercising the section 8 discretion, the Employment Court is subject to a 
restriction in section 104(2) of the EC Act: 
Where the Court has under subsection (l)(h) of this section the power to make an 
order cancelling or varying a contract or any term of a contract, it shall, 
notwithstanding anything in subsection (l)(h) of this section, make such an order only 
if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such an order should be made and 
that any other remedy would be inappropriate or inadequate. (Emphasis added.) 
Section 104(2) sets a double requirement to be satisfied before the Employment Court can 
modify a restraint clause. The court must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that: 
(a) the order should be made; and 
(b) any other remedy would be inadequate or inappropriate. 
The hurdle facing the employer, in having to prove these elements beyond reasonable doubt, 
has been set at the highest possible level. 
73 It has been noted by the judiciary and 
commentators alike that the application of the criminal burden of proof to civil proceedings 
is bizarre. 74 It can well be argued that the civil burden of proof would be more appropriate. 
72 
73 
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1038, B/78. 
18 
The reason for the double requirement remains unclear. It has been suggested that "[i]t 
possibly derives from an abundance of caution on the part of the Government, which was 
plainly determined to exclude so far as possible opportunities for intervention in employment 
contracts under the new minimalist bargaining regime. "
75 
If a hearing is in the High Court (rather than the Employment Court), and a restraint clause 
is found to be unreasonable, it is more likely that the court will be able to modify it. Section 
104(2) of the EC Act is only relevant if the Employment Court is exercising jurisdiction. It 
is irrelevant if a case is being heard in the High Court or the District Court. 
76 In the 
Employment Court, in addition to the test based on section 8 of the Illegal Contracts Act, 
section 104(2) of the EC Act must be satisfied. 
The effect of section 104(2) is to exclude the intervention of the Employment Court in many 
restraint of trade cases. Chief Judge Goddard has said that "[t]his bizarre but rigorous double 
requirement. .. could rarely be met in the case of an unreasonable restraint of trade. ,m The 
result is that often an unreasonable restraint cannot be modified. Many employers will 
therefore be defeated, and unable to restrain a former employee. 
The stringency of the section 104(2) test is in complete contrast to the High Court's approach 
to section 8 of the Illegal Contracts Act. On the H & R Block approach, a restraint could be 
modified unless there was a cogent reason not to. 
Section 104(2) also seems diametrically opposed to the policy in the EC Act of creating a 
specialist Employment Court. It has been stated that labour law matters are preferably dealt 
with by the specialist court. 78 Giving the Employment Court a very limited power to modify 
unreasonable restraint clauses does not encourage employers to bring claims to the 
Employment Court. 
The important question is: when must proceedings be heard in the Employment Court? 
C Jurisdiction of the Employment Court 
Section 3(1) of the EC Act provides that: 
This Act shall apply to all employment contracts and the Tribunal and the 
(Employment] Court shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear and determine any proceedings founded on an employment 
contract. (Emphasis added.) 
7S 
76 
77 
78 
Mazengarb's Employment Law, above n74. 
Medic Corporation Ltd v Barrett [1992] 2 ERNZ 1048, 
1063. 
Above n35, 1097. 
NZ Labourers Union v Fletcher Challenge Ltd [1988] 1 
NZLR 520, 526. 
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This means that whenever a claim is "founded on" an employment contract, it mus
t be heard 
in the Employment Court. The meaning of the words "founded on" has been the
 subject of 
judicial debate. 
A narrow interpretation of "founded on" would require that a party must procee
d upon or 
be dependant on an employment contract. 
79 This interpretation has been accepted in the 
High Court. 
A wider interpretation of "founded on" has been accepted in the Employment C
ourt. The 
Hurford v International Insurance Brokers Luf
0 case involved a deed in restraint of trade 
separate from a written contract of employment. Colgan J found that the action was "
founded 
on" an employment contract, as the two documents were "inextricably linked" and
 there was 
a very clear connection between them. 
The wider approach to the Employment Court's jurisdiction is preferable. Hamm
ond J has 
pointed to the possibility of "pleading around" section 3
81 • For example, if a claim is 
framed in terms of a breach of an equitable obligation it may not be found
ed on an 
employment contract. On the narrow approach to the words "founded on", the EC 
Act would 
have failed to eradicate jurisdiction demarcation disputes. Because a specialist em
ployment 
jurisdiction has been created, it would be preferable to widen the original jurisdic
tion of the 
Employment Court as much as possible. 
82 
The jurisdiction of the Employment Court depends on the status of the deed and t
he parties. 
If the deed is not connected to the employment contract or if there
 was no 
employer/employee relationship between the two parties, the Employment Court 
would not 
have exclusive jurisdiction. 
83 Until either the High Court or the Employment Court 
determines that the case involves a contract of service the Employment Court doe
s not have 
exclusive jurisdiction. 84 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
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Cases which appear to have been founded on an employment contract have been decided in 
the High Court. The Cooney v Welsh case
85
, heard in the High Court, involved a deed in 
restraint of trade which was entered in addition to an employment contract. The court did not 
discuss section 3 of the EC Act. The factual background in Cooney seems very similar to that 
of the Hurford case, which held that the separate deed in restraint of trade was founded on 
an employment contract. 
Cooney v Welsh should have been heard in the Employment Court. In the case, the 
employment ceased on 31 August 1992, and so was after the commencement date of the EC 
Act. 86 Holland J even acknowledged that " [ w ]e are dealing with a restraint of trade 
provision arising from a contract of employment. "
87 If the case had been heard in the 
Employment Court, section 104(2) may have altered the result. 
V ENFORCING RESTRAINT OF TRADE CLAUSES: TIIE INJUNCTION 
The validity of restraint of trade clauses is often considered in the context of interim 
injunction applications. 88 The aim of an interim injunction is to grant the plaintiff temporary 
relief until a substantive hearing. It is a discretionary remedy. 
89 
A The Legal Test for Interim Injunctions 
Before an interim injunction will be granted, the court considers a number of factors: 
(a) the threshold test; 
(b) the balance of convenience; 
(c) whether the award of damages would be more appropriate; and 
(d) the overall justice of the case. 
1 Threshold test 
There has been some uncertainty as to the threshold test for restraint of trade clauses. In 
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon
90 (which did not involve a restraint of trade) the House 
of Lords stated that the test is whether a plaintiff can establish a serious question to be tried. 
This involves satisfying a court that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious. In the recent case 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
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of Dunedin United Friendly Societies Dispensary v Windle
91
, Palmer J assumed that this was 
the threshold test to be satisfied. 
However, the threshold test was stated to be somewhat higher in the Armourguard Security
92 
case, which involved a restraint of trade. Wylie J stated that justice required more than a 
serious issue must be shown before an ex-employee is deprived of the right to work. In 
restraint of trade cases, a "prima facie case" must be shown. 
This issue is presently unresolved in New Zealand. In the DB Breweries case, Colgan J 
applied the more conventional "arguable or serious case" test. However, he did not purport 
to decide the issue and said " ... I would prefer to leave the question open for subsequent 
argument and determination in another case. "
93 
In practice, it would be difficult to differentiate between an arguable case and a prima facie 
one. On either standard, it will be difficult to ascertain whether the test is being applied 
consistently by judges. 
In any event, the difference between these two tests may not be of crucial importance. The 
New Zealand Court of Appeal has stated that the threshold test and the balance of 
convenience are merely aids in determining where the overall justice lies. 
94 Thus, the 
overall justice appears to be the ultimate test. If a court is looking at the overall justice of 
a case, the difference between an arguable case and a prima facie one will not be as 
significant. Regardless of whether a plaintiff has established an arguable or prima facie case, 
the overall justice is the predominant consideration. 
However, should a decision be necessitated as to the nature of the threshold test, the slightly 
higher "prima facie" case test is preferable. As Wylie J stated in the Armourguard Security 
case, restraint of trade clauses are prima facie invalid. An employee should not be deprived 
of the right to work lightly.95 
2 Balance of convenience 
Palmer J recently indicated that the balance of convenience is the guiding principle in 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
Above n74, 22. 
Armourguard Security Ltd v Geraghty ( 1988) 2 NZELC 
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granting interim injunctions. 96 In light of the Court of Appeal's decision in the Klissers 
case, this cannot be an accurate statement of the law. 
What is usually considered under the balance of convenience is the risk of harm to the 
employer's business if the injunction is not granted (and it eventuates at trial that the 
employer is in the right); and the nature of the injury that the employee will suffer if the 
injunction is granted (and it eventuates that the employee succeeds). 
97 
In some cases the court seems anxious to protect the employer's business interests. In the 
Medic Corporation case, while Holland J professed to give importance to the employee's 
ability to earn a living, he was quick to point out that if the employee used the confidential 
information damage could be done to the employer's business. If damage was caused it 
would be difficult for the employer to prove the quantum.
98 
One factor which should be considered under the balance of convenience is the length of time 
until a hearing. It is a particular problem with restraint of trade clauses that an interim 
injunction could effectively decide the matter. This will happen if the clause has expired by 
the time of the hearing.99 The injunction operates as a "de facto determination" of the 
clause's validity. 
Judges in recent cases have shown increasing awareness of this problem. For example, in the 
DB Breweries case, Colgan J acknowledged that if an injunction was granted it would truly 
be interlocutory, as the case was scheduled for hearing within seven weeks. 
100 
The length of time before a substantive hearing should be an important consideration in every 
interim injunction case. It is undesirable for an interim injunction to be a de facto 
determination of the case. Such hearings involve affidavit evidence, without the advantage 
of cross-examination. A court will often assume that a plaintiff will be able to prove the facts 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
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it alleges at a full hearing. 101 
If an interim injunction operates as de facto determination that the clause is valid, the 
employee is placed at a great disadvantage. The employer has been able to enforce a restraint 
(which is presumed to be invalid) on the basis of unproven facts. 
3 Availability of damages 
This consideration is often given only cursory examination. Sometimes not discussed at all, 
it is often said that damages would be too difficult to calculate. 
102 One of the problems with 
awarding damages is the possible inability of the employee to pay them. 
103 
The possibility of awarding damages should be given more attention. The problems with 
interim injunctions being a de facto determination of the case have been discussed. Unless 
there is a great risk to the employer's business if the injunction is not granted, the injunction 
should be declined and damages considered at the substantive hearing. 
4 Overall justice 
This factor was stated to be the ultimate test by the Court of Appeal in the Klissers case. 
104 
The overall justice will not necessarily favour the same party as the balance of convenience 
does. If the balance of convenience is not substantially in favour of the plaintiff, it does not 
necessarily follow that the injunction should be granted. 
105 The amount of time before a 
substantive hearing can also be considered under the overall justice. 
106 
B Consideration of Section 8 of the Illegal Contracts Act and Section 104 of the EC Act at 
the Interim Stage 
A current issue in relation to interim injunctions for restraint of trade clauses is whether the 
possible application of section 8 at trial should be considered at the interim stage. In Castle 
Parcels v Dale Henry J held that section 8 should not be invoked on an interim injunction 
application. 107 His reason was that once a clause is varied under section 8, it becomes 
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binding on the parties. Section 8 does not envisage a temporary finding. On this approach, 
if a court found a restraint to be unreasonable, no injunction could be granted. The employee 
would be free to disregard the clause. 
To ignore section 8 at the interim stage would mean that in most cases it would never arise. 
Many restraint of trade cases never reach a substantive hearing, as the term of the clause will 
have expired. 
This can be contrasted with the approach taken in the Key Graphics case. In that case, 
Tompkins J commented that the possibility of a restraint clause being found unreasonable is 
not relevant to interim injunction proceedings. If a court did reach that conclusion, section 
8 of the Illegal Contracts Act could be exercised to modify the clause. 
108 
This approach ignores the basis on which an interim injunction is granted. The party seeking 
to enforce the clause must present at least a serious argument that the clause would be 
enforced at a substantive hearing. A restraint of trade clause must be reasonable, so 
reasonableness is relevant in interim proceedings. 
The Key Graphics approach seems incompatible with the more restrictive interpretation of 
the section 8 discretion to modify expressed in the MA Watson case. As discussed above, in 
MA Watson Smellie J did not apply a presumption in favour of exercising the discretion. On 
the MA Watson approach to section 8, it is unreasonable to assume that section 8 will 
automatically modify an unreasonable clause. 
Most importantly, the Key Graphics approach is not appropriate in light of section 104(2) of 
the EC Act. At the interim stage, if the proceedings are subject to the EC Act it cannot be 
assumed that a court will modify the restraint at a substantive hearing. It would be more 
realistic to assume the opposite: that if the restraint was found to be unreasonable, the 
employer would be unable to satisfy section 104(2) and no modification would take place. 
The preferable approach is the compromise reached in the DB Breweries case. Colgan J held 
that the section 8 power to modify should not be the sole reason for upholding a restraint 
clause by injunction. However, the possibilities of the final outcome cannot be ignored.
109 
The potential application of section 8, therefore, must be considered. For the injunction to 
be granted, DB had to establish an arguable case that the court would be satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that a modification should be made and that other remedies would be 
inadequate or inappropriate. 
In the DB Breweries case, Colgan J tied considering the probability of modification to the 
108 
109 
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short time lapse before a substantive hearing. 
110 He contrasted this with the Greenwich 
case, where Barker J did not see the existence of a right to recast the contract as a reason 
for granting an injunction. In the Greenwich case, there was no indication as to when a 
substantive hearing would take place. If there was likely to be a substantial delay before a 
hearing, a judge would be reluctant to grant an injunction. 
The DB Breweries approach is a compromise between those proposed in Key Graphics and 
Castle Parcels. Colgan J does not ignore the possibility that section 8 may be utilised at trial 
(as the Castle Parcels approach does). However, Colgan J does not assume that, if required, 
section 8 will modify an unreasonable clause (as Tompkins J does in Key Graphics). The 
plaintiff must establish an arguable case for the exercise of section 8 if the clause was found 
to be unreasonable. 111 
This approach may lead to some injustice. If an employer can establish an arguable case that 
the clause could be modified at trial, an injunction can be granted. A potentially unreasonable 
clause is being enforced. In the DB Breweries case, for example, once the employer 
established a prima facie case, a fairly broad clause was enforced. 
112 At least in DB 
Breweries, though, the case was scheduled for a prompt hearing. 
The rationale of Colgan J, in linking a consideration of the possibility of modification to the 
time before trial, seems reasonable. If a fairly prompt trial is likely, the possibility of later 
modification could be allowed for in granting an injunction. However, if a prompt hearing 
is unlikely, a court should be slow to grant an interim injunction solely because at trial it 
could be modified and enforced. Granting an injunction in that situation could decide the 
matter finally. 
As the DB Breweries case illustrates, the impact of section 104(2) of the EC Act is linked 
to a consideration of section 8 of the Illegal Contracts Act. At the interim injunction stage, 
on the basis of the DB Breweries approach, the plaintiff must make out an arguable case that 
section 104(2) is satisfied. However, whether section 104(2) adds anything to the 
considerations involved in an interim injunction scenario is doubtful. 
The second limb of the section 104(2) test (that any other remedy would be inappropriate or 
inadequate) is similar to an element considered for any interim injunction: whether damages 
would be an appropriate remedy. The first limb of the section 104(2) test (that the order 
should be made) is something that the court will be considering in a general manner 
110 
111 
112 
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anyway. 113 
At the interim stage, therefore, the section 104(2) test may not add any substantive 
considerations. It is more likely that its major effect will be on the burden of proof. As the 
DB Breweries case has made clear, the plaintiff must establish an arguable case that the court 
will be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a modification should be made. 
114 The 
beyond reasonable doubt standard may increase the amount of evidence an employer must 
bring before an injunction will be granted. 
The effect of section 104(2) may be more dramatic in relation to final injunctions, which do 
not involve the same structured analysis of threshold issue, balance of convenience, 
availability of damages, and overall justice. In these cases, section 104 adds an extra, and 
very stringent, requirement which must be satisfied in the Employment Court before the 
injunction can be granted. 115 
C Jurisdiction of the Employment Coun in relation to Injunctions 
Finally, an issue which has been given recent consideration is whether the Employment Court 
has jurisdiction under section 104(l)(h) of the EC Act to grant injunctions. In the Medic 
Corporation case, Temm J suggested that the Employment Court does not have such a 
jurisdiction. 116 
However, this approach has not been followed in the Employment Court. In Xv Y Ltd & 
New Zealand Stock Exchange
117 Colgan J stated that section 104(l)(h) cannot be read in 
isolation. The Employment Court was intended to have all the tools previously possessed by 
courts of ordinary jurisdiction. Colgan J did not accept the argument that because injunctions 
were specifically mentioned in other parts of the Act, the remedy was impliedly excluded in 
this part of the Act. 
Colgan J' s approach has been upheld by the Court of Appeal in Board of Trustees of Timaru 
High School v Hobday118 , where Casey J held that the wording of subsection 104(l)(h) is 
wide enough to encompass the High Court's powers to make interim injunctions.
119 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
See for instance Key Graphics, above n34. 
Above n74, 12. 
See the discussion at above Part IV B. 
Medic Corporation, above n76, 1064; Mazengarb's 
Employment Law, above n74, A/77. 
(1992] 1 ERNZ 863. 
(1993] 2 ERNZ 146. 
See also Northern Local Government Officers Union Inc. 
v Auckland City (1992] 1 ERNZ 1109, 1129. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
The first conclusion which can be drawn from this paper is that the limits of the restraint of 
trade doctrine have not yet been fully tested. It is at least arguable that it could be extended 
to cover garden leave clauses, and at least some clauses prohibiting secondary employment. 
This is an issue which will have to be decided by future litigation. 
The introduction of section 104(2) of the EC Act has greatly complicated the area. Unless 
compelled to do so, an employer would be well advised to avoid the jurisdiction of the 
Employment Court. If an employer can bring a claim in the High Court, section 104 is 
avoided altogether. In this sense, section 104 is problematic because it undermines the 
jurisdiction of the Employment Court. 
This paper has canvassed a number of complex issues in relation to the use of interim 
injunctions to enforce restraints of trade. An emerging consideration which has been 
highlighted is the delay before a substantive hearing. It is hoped that the current trend will 
continue, and that awareness of this factor will influence the granting of interim stays. 
In conclusion, employment law relating to restraint of trade is far from static, and has the 
potential to be used in new and creative ways by litigants. 
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